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Abstract
Adversarial attacks during the testing phase of neural networks pose a challenge
for the deployment of neural networks in security critical settings. These attacks
can be performed by adding noise that is imperceptible to humans on top of the
original data. By doing so, an attacker can create an adversarial sample, which
will cause neural networks to misclassify. In this paper, we seek to understand
the theoretical limits of what can be learned by neural networks in the presence
of an adversary. We first defined the hypothesis space of a neural network, and
showed the relationship between the growth number of the entire neural network
and the growth number of each neuron. Combine that with the adversarial Vapnik-
Chervonenkis(VC)-dimension of halfspace classifiers, we concluded the adversarial
VC-dimension of the neural networks with sign activation functions.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has become the fastest growing area of computer science, and neural networks are
among the most studied among all ML algorithms because of their impressive performance in areas
like image recognition, natural language processing, etc. However, practical neural networks are
often vulnerable to adversarial attacks: given an input x and any target label t, it is possible to find
an x′ that is very similar to x but which neural networks will misclassify as the target label t. This
makes it difficult to apply neural networks in security critical areas like self-driving cars, malware
detection systems, facial recognition systems to unlock devices, etc. Carlini et al. created the state
of the art attacks on image recognition systems [1] and speech recognition systems [2]. Some have
proposed methods, like adversarial training [3], for creating neural networks that are robust against
adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we aim to understand more about neural networks in the presence of a test time
adversary. In particular, we try to see if the sample complexity of neural networks is different in the
presence of adversaries. We show that, for some simple networks, the sample complexity bound
does not change with the introduction of an adversary. We prove this for neural networks with sign
activation functions by combining known bounds on sample complexity with recent bounds on the
adversarial VC-dimension of halfspace classifiers from Cullina et al. [4]
We first describe the adversarial PAC-learning framework. After that, we formally specify our neural
network. Finally we prove that the VC-dimension bound is unchanged by the introduction of an
adversary.
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1.1 PAC-learning in the presence of an adversary
In this section, we setup the framework for PAC-learning in the presence of an evasion adversary,
which is one that generates and presents the learner with adversarial examples during the test phase
but does not interfere with the training.
In our setup, there is an unknown distribution PX×Y . The learner receives training data S =
((x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)) ∼ PnX×Y and outputs hˆ ∈ H. The adversary receives data (x, y) ∈ PX×Y
and outputs some x′ ∈ N(x), where N(x) defines a neighborhood around x. The neighborhood of x
is defined as N(x) = {x′ ∈ X : R(x, x′) ≤ } where R(x, x′) defines a nearness relationship.
Under this new framework, the adversarial expected risk, LP , is defined as the learner’s risk under
the true distribution PX×Y in the presence of an adversary constrained by the nearness relation R,
and LS is defined as the adversarial empirical risk with the same adversary
LP (h,R) = E(x,y)∼PX×Y
[
max
x′∈N(x)
`(h(x′), y)
]
LS(h,R) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
max
x′∈N(xi)
`(h(x′), yi)
]
The goal of the learner is to minimize the adversarial expected risk. Because calculating the expected
risk over the distribution PX×Y is infeasible, the learner instead aims to minimize the adversarial
empirical risk. The algorithm that selects the hypothesis hˆ that minimizes the adversarial empirical
risk from the hypothesis space H, with nearness relation R, is called Adversarial Empirical Risk
Minimization and we define the objective as follows
AERMH,R(S) = argminh∈HLS(h,R)
1.2 Corrupted hypotheses
In this section, we describe the concept of a corrupted hypothesis class. The presence of an adversary
forces the learner to learn with corrupted hypothesis. Instead of just predicting ±1, corrupted
hypothesis also outputs ⊥ that means "always wrong".
For Y = {−1, 1}, let the corrupted output space be Y˜ = {−1, 1,⊥}. Now we can define the
corruption function as a mapping from a hypothesis to the corrupted version κR : (X 7→ Y) 7→
(X 7→ Y˜):
κR(h) = x→

−1 ∀x′ ∈ N(x) : h(x′) = −1
1 ∀x′ ∈ N(x) : h(x′) = 1
⊥ ∃x′0, x′1 ∈ N(x) : h(x′0) 6= h(x′1)
Using this, we can define the set of corrupted hypotheses as H˜ = {κR(h) : h ∈ H}. In other
words, the hypothesis will predict "always wrong" when the test data x is in the neighborhood where
different labels exist.
We also define the loss function λ, and the loss classes F and F˜ which are derived fromH and H˜
respectively
λ(h) = X × Y˜ → {0, 1}
F = {λ(h) : h ∈ H}
F˜ = {λ(h˜) : h˜ ∈ H˜}
We can define the equivalent shattering coefficient in terms of the loss class as
σ′(F , i) = max
(x′,y)∈X i×Yi
|{(f(x′1, y1), . . . , f(x′i, yi)) : f ∈ F}|
Finally, the Adversarial VC-dimension is defined as
AV C(H, R) = sup{n ∈ N : σ′(λ(H˜), n) = 2n}
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1.3 Adversarial VC-dimension of halfspace classifiers
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the adversary has standard `p norm-based constraints
that are usually imposed on evasion adversaries as described in the literature [1, 3]. As it turns out,
the adversarial VC-dimension for halfspace classifiers corrupted by `p norm-constrained adversary
is equal to the standard VC-dimension [4]. That is: Let H be the family of halfspace classifiers
of X ∈ Rd. Then the adversarial VC-dimension of H in the presence of an adversary with `p
norm-based constraints is AV C(H, R) = d+ 1.
2 Adversarial VC-dimension of Neural Networks with Sign Activation
Function
2.1 Define the Neural Network
We define a general neural network described by a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), where all
neurons have the same activation function σ(a). In a neural network of depth T , let V0, . . . , VT be the
layers of the neural network and let E(t−1,t) be the weights connecting the layers Vt−1 and Vt. Any
layer Vt has |Vt| number of neurons. We can express our neural network’s overall hypothesis space
as a composition of the hypothesis spaces of each layer, H = H(T ) ◦ H(T−1) ◦ · · · ◦ H(1) where
H(t) = {f : R|Vt−1| 7→ R|Vt|}. We analyze the adversarial VC-dimension and sample complexity
for this family of hypotheses in the event of an evasion attack.
2.2 Neural Networks with Sign Activation Function
To simplify our hypothesis space, we choose the activation function to be σ(a) = 1[a>0], and let
H(t) = {f : R|Vt−1| 7→ {±1}|Vt|}. With this activation function, each neuron in each layer turns
into a halfspace classifier:
∀t ∈ [T ], Vt = sign(〈E(t−1,t), Vt−1〉)
Cullina et al. showed that the adversarial VC dimension of a halfspace classifier for X = Rd is d+ 1
[4]. In the previous section, we showed that the hypothesis class of a neural networkH can be written
as a composition of its layers,H = H(T ) ◦ · · · ◦ H(1). The following lemma shows that the growth
function of a composition of hypothesis classes is bounded by the products of the growth functions of
the individual classes.
Lemma 1 Let F1 be a set of functions from X to Z and let F2 be a set of functions
from Z to Y . Let H = F2 ◦ F1 be the composition class. That is, ∀f1 ∈ F1 and
f2 ∈ F2 : ∃h ∈ H s.t. h(x) = f2(f1(x)). The growth function of H, τH(m), is bounded
by τH(m) ≤ τF1(m)τF2(m)
Proof:
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ⊆ X . Then
|HC | = |{f2(f1(c1)), . . . , f2(f1(cm)) : f1 ∈ F1, f2 ∈ F2}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
f1∈F1
{(f2(f1(c1)), . . . , f2(f1(cm))) : f2 ∈ F2}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |F1C | · τF2(m)
≤ τF1(m)τF2(m)
τH(m) ≤ τF1(m)τF2(m) 
Therefore, the growth function of the hypothesis space of neural networks is bounded by:
τH(m) ≤
T∏
t=1
τH(t)(m)
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In addition, eachH(t) can written as a product of individual neurons,H(t) = H(t,1)× · · · ×H(t,|Vt|),
where eachH(t,j) is a halfspace classifier: H(t,j) = {f : R|Vt−1| 7→ {±1}}. The following lemma
shows that the growth function of the Cartesian product class is bounded by the products of the
growth functions of the individual classes:
Lemma 2 For i = 1, 2, let Fi be a set of functions from X to Yi. Define H = F1 × F2 to be the
Cartesian product class. That is, ∀f1 ∈ F1 and f2 ∈ F2 : ∃h ∈ H s.t. h(x) = (f1(x), f2(x)). The
growth function ofH is bounded by: τH(m) ≤ τF1(m)τF2(m)
Proof:
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} ⊆ X . Then
|HC | = |{((f1(c1), f2(c1)), . . . , (f1(cm), f2(cm))) : f1 ∈ F1, f2 ∈ F2}|
= |{((f1(c1), . . . , f1(cm)), (f2(c1), . . . , f2(cm))) : f1 ∈ F1, f2 ∈ F2}|
= |F1C ×F2C |
= |F1C | · |F2C |
τH(m) ≤ τF1(m)τF2(m) 
Therefore, the growth function of each layer can be bounded by:
τH(t)(m) ≤
|Vt|∏
i=1
τH(t,i)(m)
Combining these two lemmas, the growth function of the entire neural network is bounded by:
τH(m) ≤
T∏
t=1
|Vt|∏
i=1
τH(t,i)(m)
Since the adversaries are only able to change the inputs, we only corrupt the first layer by introducing
an adversary. However, since the adversarial VC-dimension of halfspace classifiers of dimension d
is d+ 1, the same as the regular VC-dimension, we can say that the ith neuron in all hidden layers
have an effective VC-dimension of dt,i, where dt,i is the number of edges that are going into the ith
neuron of the tth layer, assuming that one edge accounts for the bias term.
Using this alongside our growth function bound, we can use Sauer’s lemma to show that:
τH(m) ≤
T∏
t=1
|Vt|∏
i=1
(
em
dt,i
)dt,i
≤
T∏
t=1
|Vt|∏
i=1
(em)
dt,i = (em)
(∑T
t=1
∑|Vt|
i=1 dt,i
)
Notice that
∑T
t=1
∑|Vt|
i=1 dt,i is just the number of edges in the neural network, therefore we have:
τH(m) ≤ (em)|E|
Let there be a set of size m that is shattered by the neural network. Therefore the growth number
τH(m) = 2m. Combining this with τH(m) ≤ (em)|E|, we have that:
2m ≤ (em)|E|
The following lemma shows that m must be O(|E| log(|E|)) in order to satisfy the inequality.
Lemma 3 If a neural network’s hypothesis spaceH has |E| number of parameters, let m be the size
of the setH shatters. If the inequality 2m ≤ (em)|E| is satisfied, thenH has sample complexity of
O(|E| log(|E|)).
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Proof:
2m ≤ (em)|E|
m log(2) ≤ |E| log(em)
m ≤ |E|
log(2)
log(em)
em ≤ e|E|
log(2)
log(em)
Lemma A.1 in [5] states: "for a ≥ 0, if x ≥ 2a log(a) then x ≥ a log(x)". We can take the
contrapositive to get: "if x < a log(x) then x < 2a log(a)" and apply it
em <
2e|E|
log(2)
log
(
e|E|
log(2)
)
m <
2|E|
log(2)
log
(
e|E|
log(2)
)
Ignoring the constants, we have:s
m ≤ O(|E| log |E|) 
Putting all of these pieces together, we now have a bound on the adversarial VC-dimension for our
network.
Theorem 1 For a neural network with sign activation functions, the adversarial VC-dimension has
the same bound as the regular VC-dimension.
Proof:
From Lemma 3, we can see that the AVC-dimension of neural networks with sign activation function
is O(|E| log |E|). We know from Theorem 20.6 in [5] that the regular VC-dimension of neural
networks with sign activation function is also O(|E| log |E|).
3 Extending corrupted hypotheses
One big issue with the corrupted hypothesis class as defined by Cullina et al. is that it limits the
expressiveness of the hypotheses by requiring ±1 output [4]. In order to overcome this issue, we
introduce two generalizations of the corrupted hypothesis class. The first is a generalization to
multi-class corrupted hypotheses.
κR(h) = x→
{
h(x) ∀x′ ∈ N(x) : h(x) = h(x′)
⊥ ∃x′0, x′1 ∈ N(x) : h(x′0) 6= h(x′1)
This is more of a generalization in notation than anything else because we simply output the normal
label of x for the hypothesis if it agrees on all the neighbors of x, and reject it if it doesn’t. In the ±1
case, this version simplifies down to the original form of the equation.
However, this version is still impractical for problems without a reasonable number of outputs or for
any problem which has more complex relationships between the outputs. To solve these problems,
we introduce our second new form of the corrupted hypothesis class which we call the continuous
corruption class.
κR,d(h) = x→
{
h(x) ∀x′ ∈ N(x) : d(h(x), h(x′)) ≤ δ
⊥ ∃x′0, x′1 ∈ N(x) : d(h(x′0), h(x′1)) > δ
Here, d defines a distance metric on Y which is analogous to R, the distance metric on X . Instead of
looking for perfect agreement among all the neighbors, we instead allow normal predictions on x,
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when any of the neighbors of x would have sufficiently similar outputs. This formulation now allows
us to describe the corrupted version of any hypothesis class, instead of only binary ones. It should
be possible to theoretically describe how easy it is to corrupt any hypothesis class by comparing the
normal and corrupted versions.
This formulation directly relates to our own problem of discovering VC-dimension of neural networks
in adversarial environments. The original framework restricted us to ±1 output for the network and,
for our proof of the bound, even for each node of the network. By using the continuous corruption
class, we can instead look at adversarial elements of continuous functions, including many other
common activation functions such as Sigmoids, Tanh, or ReLU. All of these are actually used in
practice, while our version using sign activation is primarily a theoretical model.
Beyond accommodating for continuous functions, this generalization also allows for more interesting
relationships between the output. For example, when classifying images for self-driving cars, it is a
big problem if an adversary can make your model see a car instead of a human, but probably less of a
problem if your model is made to see a car instead of a truck. Obviously there are may be problems
either way, but when you have a lot of classes or continuous outputs, then intelligently picking your
distance metric could help make the model robust without relying on perfect predictions.
4 Conclusion
We analyzed the adversarial VC-dimension and sample complexity for neural networks with sign
activation function and showed that it could achieve the same bound as the non-adversarial case.
Though Cullina et. al. did show that the AVC-dimension could be arbitrarily larger or smaller than
the ordinary VC-dimension, we have shown that there exist learners, including at least some neural
networks, which may be highly resilient to adversarial attacks given sufficient training data. In
practice however, we find that neural networks are often highly susceptible to adversarial attacks.
This may be because of the number of training samples used in practice is usually significantly less
than the sample complexity, and the learned model is overfitting to the limited training set so it
doesn’t generalize well to the true distribution.
A natural extension to our work, which may help to show if that is true, is to find the adversarial
VC-dimension of neural networks with some other activation functions such as Sigmoid, Tanh or
ReLU. These are of particular interest because they are some of the most widely used in practice. The
difficulty with the analysis of those activation functions arises from the fact that they are continuous
and map R 7→ R. Because each neuron has real output, it becomes hard to use the same proof
techniques, because we cannot look at the AVC-dimension for a single neuron. That being said,
there are many other methods which could potentially be used to prove these bounds. These include
existing methods which bound the sample complexity for neural networks with sigmoid activation
functions. For some of these functions, we may also be able to look at an adversarial Rademacher
complexity and bound the sample complexity that way. We leave the exploration of these methods to
future work.
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